Theories of dignity have to navigate their way between two apparently quite different conceptions. There is the old idea of dignity in the sense of the Roman dignitas-the status attached to a specific role or rank in a system of nobility and hierarchical office. And there is the egalitarian idea of human dignity, understood as invested in every human person from the highest to the lowest, from the moral hero to the most despicable criminal. This human dignity is supposed to attach to everyone no matter what their rank or role, and it remains with them inalienably no matter what they do or what happens to them. Theorists of dignity manage the relation between these conceptions in one of two ways: either they tell a story about the human dignity conception superseding the dignitas conception after a long period of uneasy coexistence since the time of the Stoic philosophers; or they tell a story about the dignitas conception morphing into the more egalitarian conception, a story that does not involve severing the connection between dignity and rank but involves a sort of transvaluation of dignitas, associating a high ranking status-a sort of nobility for everyone-with humanity as such. 
Kant on the Dignity of a Citizen
The philosophy of Immanuel Kant is almost always associated with the second conception-dignity attaching to humanity as such. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says that humanity has dignity insofar as it is capable intriguing link that is established in this way between human dignity and dignitas seems to me to be worth exploring.
I want to take this exploration beyond the confines of Kant's philosophy. I want to consider its implications for human dignity generally and for the connections between citizenship and dignity that have been establishedin the twentieth century as well as in the eighteenth. But first, it is worth noting some peculiarities of Kant's own account.
First, immediately after having introduced this connection between being a human being and having the dignity of citizenship, Kant qualifies the universality of the latter: "The exception is someone who has lost it by his own crime."
7 This is not portrayed as derogating from the universality of human dignity, for later in the same work he invokes human dignity to secure a modicum of respect for and to limit the punishments that may be imposed upon vicious criminals. 8 So it indicates a possible dissonance between the two concepts.
Secondly, as is well known, Kant imagines two grades of citizenshipactive citizenship and passive citizenship-with the lower grade assigned to those who cannot present themselves in social, economic, and political life as fully independent of others. Only independent citizens-those who are not dependent directly on others for their livelihood-have "the right to manage the state as active members of it," as voters or as jurors, for example. 9 If human dignity as such is connected to citizenship, it must presumably be connected to passive citizenship, 7 Ibid., 471-2 (6:329-30).
8 Ibid., 580 (6:463): "I cannot deny all respect to even a vicious man as a human being; I cannot withdraw at least the respect that belongs to him in his quality as a human being, even though by his deeds he makes himself unworthy of it. So there can be disgraceful punishments that dishonor humanity itself (such as quartering a man, having him torn by dogs, cutting off his nose and ears)." 9 Ibid., 458-9 (6:315).
and Kant says as much when he notes that the passive citizens' "dependence upon the will of others and this inequality is, however, in no way opposed to their freedom and equality as human beings." They are still entitled to be treated "in accordance with the laws of natural freedom of equality," and treated indeed as persons who make up the people of the state, for whose sake and for whose moral co-existence civil society is established.
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It is important to see how uncomfortable Kant thought we should be about this idea of passive citizenship: "the concept of a passive citizen seems to contradict the concept of a citizen as such." 11 In the "Theory and Practice" essay, Kant suggested that those whom he later called "passive citizens" shouldn't be called citizens at all but "cobeneficiaries." 12 But it is not just a matter of finding an appropriate label. I think Kant's view is that all humans are to be regarded in as active a light as possible in the commonwealth of which they are subjects, whether they can vote or not. Their must always be some possibility of advancing from the passive ranks to the active ranks, similar to the requirements of equal opportunity or offices open to talents that Kant also insists upon. 13 Nobody is to be frozen into passive citizenship by birth or descent.
That anticipates a third distinctive feature of Kant's account of citizenship.
Kant is a hypothetical contractarian. For Kant, anyone's citizenship connotes a sense of the appropriateness of treating them and dealing with them as though they were contracting founders of the state. Not that they actually were, but the Kantian 10 Ibid., 458 (6:315).
11 Ibid.,458 (6:314).
12 Immanuel Kant, "On the Common Saying: That may be Correct in Theory, but it is of no Use in Practice" (hereafter TP) in Kant, Practical Philosophy, p. 294 (8:294). 13 Ibid., 292-3 (8:292).
principle is that they must be regarded in this light. The idea of an original contract is only an idea of reason, which, however, has its undoubted practical reality, namely to bind very legislator to give his laws in such a way that they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people and to regard each subject, insofar as he wants to be a citizen, as if he has joined in voting for such a will.
14 And though it is only hypothetical, it generates a test of the actual legitimacy of any measure: "If a public law is so constituted that a whole people could not possibly give its consent to it … it is unjust." 15 (Once again, the example he gives of a law discredited by this test is one providing for the establishment of a system of differential hereditary dignities.)
A fourth point: though Kant's authoritarianism is well known, it is not on account of his denigrating the idea of citizenship. Citizens are like framers and law-givers: they are conceived to have made the state for themselves rather than to be merely the subjects of authoritarian imposition. They must defer to the state and to the law, but still their difference is to something conceived of as made by them:
the compulsory character of the deference is a reflection of the fact that, even under ideal circumstances, the making and nourishing of a state by those who are to be its citizens is conceived as a moral necessity not as the exercise of an option.
No one ever had the moral option to remain in a state of nature, and no one has the moral option to revert to it at least as long as a well-organized state subsists.
Fifth, for Kant, the dignity of citizenship is constituted partly by the fact that being a citizen in a well-ordered state is something of an achievement-albeit a 14 Ibid., 296-7 (8:297). The relation this establishes between Kant's moral and political philosophy is extremely interesting. On the one hand it indicates a sort of priority for the latter over the former (which is not the usual order of batting in Kant interpretation): we draw on certain political ideals to make sense of our moral capacities. And the idea of law-giving and a systematic union under common laws must be worked out first and foremost in political philosophy before being used as an illuminating device in moral philosophy. But it is not just a device. As humans we have capacities that are already civic or citizenly in form even before we make ourselves into citizens in an active polity. What each of us is essentially-in our moral character, in our pre-political capacities, and in our political environment-is a (potential) citizen.
So our human dignity is in large part the dignity of (potential) citizenship. What we become when we make ourselves into and behave as good citizens in an actual polity is a realization of what we always were: persons capable of living with others under laws which each of us has joined in making for ourselves.
19 Ibid., 85 (4:435). 20 Ibid., 87-8 (4:438-9).
21 Ibid., 89 (4:440). relations with one another from a state of anarchy to something like an ordering in a loose federation under common laws. This is an imperative not just for sovereigns, but in a world of republics for citizens too: citizens of each nation have a responsibility to act politically in ways that make a "cosmopolitan constitution"
possible. 27 To the extent that they discharge this responsibility, they act not just as citizens of their own polity but as citizens of the world. Kant even speculates that it is only in this latter capacity that they bring about a harmony of politics with morals. 28 In this way, the dignity of citizenship can finally present itself as a realization of the dignity of a moral being.
Citizenship and Human Dignity
I embarked on this long exploration of Immanuel Kant's view of the dignity of citizenship because I think the subtle connections he establishes between the dignity associated with the political role of citizenship and the dignity of the human person in general resonate beyond the confines of his particular philosophy.
They have implications for the way we think about human dignity in the modern world.I do not want to argue that human dignity and the dignity of citizenship are the same, or that the latter approximates the former. powers, duties, and liabilities,determined in its content and application as a matter of law rather than as a matter of choice and united by aunderlying social concern focused on individuals of certain types or in certain predicaments. The dignity of citizenship just is this status, or this status of citizenship regarded in a positive light. Not every status is a dignity: "dignity" is usually associated with a status that is valued and particularly respected; we don't talk about the dignity of felony or bankruptcy. But the remarkable thing about citizenship as a dignity-something it shares in common with human dignity-is that it is a status that is cherished as special notwithstanding the fact that it is widely spread among the members of a community.
Of course citizenship is not just one thing. It changes over time. 30 And it differs, both in its implications and prerequisites, from one country to another.
Countries differ on the basis on which they assign citizenship. In the United These are the normal or normative incidents of citizenship. Together, as I said, they add up to a status in each polity that is special, equal, and pervasive.
Citizenship is a high status: it comprises important rights like the franchise and the right to inhabit a certain country; even those incidents of it that involve duties or liabilities are in some sense valued by those who have them and coveted by those who don't. It is an equal status: by contrast with Kant's conception, citizenship in most countries does not admit of classes; the term "second-class citizen,"
whenever it is used, is always a reproach against the society that is supposed to be imposing the distinctions it connotes.
Above all, citizenship is understood to be pervasive. In principle, the expectation is that all or most of those who make a life in a given country will be its citizens. In countries of immigration, it is expected that long-term resident aliens will take out citizenship in due course. 31 That citizenship is a high status dignity does not mean it is the special right of a few or even of a large privileged class in a society. Instead, citizenship is supposed to indicate the general quality of the relationship between the state and those subject to its power. By and large those subject to state power are not to be treated as mere subjects, but as active and empowered members of the political community for which the state is responsible.
The close connection between the idea of citizenship and the idea of a popular republican or democratic constitution is supposed to indicate-as a fundamental premise of any good polity-thatthe government is always accountable to those over whom it rules.
Of course most advanced democracies are countries of immigration, and So much is this so that the term is often used loosely in political philosophy to refer to anyone who lives in a country and is subject to its government, whether they are citizens in the strict sense or not. Though this usage has its dangers, it has its advantages too. 32 As I said earlier, citizenship connotes not only the rights, powers, and responsibilities of a privileged class, but also the general quality of relationship between the state and those subject to its power. Most constitutional rights and other legal protections enjoyed by those who are, in the technical sense, citizens of a given polity are likely to be enjoyed by non-citizens too. In the United States, free speech, due process rights, equal protection, and antidiscrimination-all of these apply more or less to anyone within the jurisdiction, and the spirit in which they apply is (roughly) the spirit of citizenship. The government is required to treat everyone in the country with respect and it can be held to account for maltreatment of anyone, citizen or not. And it is required to show concern for the interests, well-being, and opportunities of everyone in its jurisdiction. This equality of concern and respect goes far beyond the dignity of citizenship in the narrow sense.
Does this mean that, in the looser sense, the dignity of the citizen merges with human dignity as such? Not quite. Even when it applies to all humans in a given country, the idea of the dignity of the citizen remains specific and relational:
it directs us to something like a membership-relation or a constituent-relation between an individual and the government of the country where that individual resides. In principle, the idea of human dignity abstracts from that. It too is a status connoting equality and comprising a number of rights-we call them human rights. 32 For some concerns about this, see Gerald Neuman, "Rhetorical Slavery, Rhetorical Citizenship," Michigan Law Review, 90 (1992), 1276.
Though rights make no sense without correlative duties and though the bearers of the duties correlative to human rights are usually states in the first instance, talk of human dignity is not already talk of a relation between particular persons and particular states. It makes sense to say that human dignity may represent a claim against all mankind, but it makes little sense to say that about the dignity of the citizen. Perhaps if we make it clear that we are talking-as we saw Kant sometimes talking-about citizenship of the world, then the distinction begins to blur. But, that apart, the dignity of the citizen perhaps represents one possible realization of human dignity. Everyone's having a state that is responsible for her and a particular political community to which she belongs is a way of realizing human dignity, maybe the best way; but it doesn't mean that human dignity and the dignity of the citizen are the same thing. nothing more than the pointless infliction of suffering." 34 It seems to be part of dignity's role to patrol the extremities of punishment; we saw this earlier in Kant's reference to "disgraceful punishments that dishonor humanity itself."
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But denationalization is not in itself painful or cruel in the ordinary sense.
As This is the basis on Chief Justice Warren agreed with the court below that "the American concept of man's dignity does not comport with making even those we would punish completely 'stateless'-fair game for the despoiler at home and the oppressor abroad, if indeed there is any place which will tolerate them at all."
36
All this is true and important: respect for human dignity is incompatible with the creation of this sort of vulnerability. But it is hard not to read this passage also in the light of discussions of the significance of statelessness for human rights that were also taking place in the United States in this same period. Hannah Arendt's account was the most prominent. The stateless person, she said, was in a sort of legal limbo, a situation of constantly having to transgress the law, indeed a situation of being necessarily governed directly by police power rather than by the rule of law (which would have assumed violations were the exception not the rule). 37 One might have thought, she said, that the situation of these people would have been covered at least by human rights: but it turned out that without a nationality, without an attachment to and recognition by the legal system of a state, human rights were worthless
The Rights of Man … had been defined as "inalienable" because they were supposed to be independent of all governments; but it turned out that the moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them.
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Paradoxically, human rights worked only for those who were citizens of a state:
36 As quoted by Warren C.J., in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), at 101n. 37 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973), 287-8. 38 Ibid., 268
[C]ivil rights-that is the varying rights of citizens in different countrieswere supposed to embody and spell out in the form of tangible laws the eternal Rights of Man, which by themselves were supposed to be independent of citizenship and nationality. All human beings were citizens of some kind of political community; if the laws of their country did not live up to the demands of the Rights of Man, they were expected to change them, by legislation in democratic countries or through revolutionary action in despotisms.
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But if one were not a citizen of a community, there was no legal framework within which one could agitate for one's human rights. Because loss of national rights was identical with loss of human rights, it quickly became apparent that the most important right was the right to have rights, the right to be a member of an organized community where one's claims of right would matter.
No doubt, Arendt's pessimism about human rights was exaggerated. But the connection she drew between the human rights and the rights of the citizen is important. The great declarations and covenants of human rights associate rights very closely with human dignity, and it might seem that this association eclipses mere rights of citizenship. But it turns out both in practice and in theory that human rights are not normally secure unless they are incorporated in each country into the legal fabric that provides for citizenship. 40 In real terms, then, the dignity of the citizen will be a necessary concomitant of human dignity. And an exploration of the contours of civic dignity will be an indispensable part of our theory of dignity as it applies to human beings as such. 39 Ibid., 293. 40 See, e.g., International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, Preamble and Article 2.
Rights and Responsibilities
Aristotle famously maintained that a good citizen is one who knows how to rule and how to be ruled. 41 Citizens need to know both how to occupy political office-as a juror, for example, or as a member of the legislative assembly (in modern democracies as a voter or as a representative). But they also need to know how to receive and act upon decisions made by others: how to obey laws whose enactment one opposed or how to accept the verdict of a court when it decides in favor of the other party. On this account, the virtues of citizenship include the virtues of submission and restraint.
Now virtue is not the same as dignity, but one of the distinctive things about the introduction of the concept of human dignity into modern legal and political discourse is that it is formally capable of grounding duties and responsibilities as easily as it grounds rights and liberties. I don't just mean that it grounds a duty to respect the dignity of others; though it does; any emancipatory concept like rights will generate correlative duties of that kind. I mean that dignity also generates certain responsibilities upon each person conceived as the bearer of dignity; it is not a wholly emancipatory concept. 42 Kant associated human dignity with certain duties to oneself-not only the sense of duty which lay at the core of the moral capacity that was the ground of dignity, but duties of self-respect and selfmaintenance in regard to "the dignity of humanity within us." question certain claims to freedom-the claim to be able to degrade oneself for money, for example, in prostitution or in various forms of demeaning display. 44 In fact, the dignity of citizenship illustrates three, not just two ways in which duties and responsibilities may be implicated. As well as (i) the duty to respect others' dignity (the duty that is correlative to the rights-based aspect of their dignity), there is also a distinction between (ii) the duty to submit to law and to political defeat, on the one hand, and (iii) the responsibility associated with the active exercise of citizenship rights, on the other.
Aristotle's contrast illustrates (ii): one must know how to be ruled; this is particularly important in modern democracies, where individuals and parties take it in turns to rule and be ruled depending on the vicissitudes of the electoral cycle.
We must reject any association of political defeat with degradation or humiliation.
Submissive postures like obedience to the law and acceptance of political defeat are not incompatible with the dignity of citizenship; they are part of its essence.
But even when one is politically in the ascendant, the element of responsibility is still present. The rights and powers associated with citizenship are things one possesses not for one's own sake but for the common good, and that imposes a certain discipline upon the way in which one exercises them. This is what I meant by (iii) the responsibility associated with the active exercise of citizenship rights. Elsewhere I have argued that many rights are best conceived as responsibility rights-the right to be trusted with and to exercise a certain important responsibility in society or in a political system. 45 The rights of parents, for example, are best seen in this light; so are many of the role-related rights generated for particular offices by the hierarchical notion of dignitas, and so, I
think, are the political rights associated with the dignity of citizenship. Part of the respect bound up with citizenship is our respect for the capacity of individuals to rise to the responsibility of looking beyond their own interests to policies, laws, and frameworks which respond fairly to the interests of all. Citizenship is a dignity because it credits its bearers with having what it takes to fulfill this role.
Contractarian Respect
I have referred several times to the close connection between citizenship and democracy. I guess one can be a citizen in an absolute monarchy, but Aristotle was right to insist that "our definition of citizen is best applied in a democracy." and subjects and, when we do so, we mean to emphasize that a citizen is not just one who is at the mercy of an independently existing state and for whose sake certain constraints and requirements are imposed upon that state. The state is to be treated as though it were a concoction of the citizens, something that they have made and that they sustain together for the benefit of them all. And so each of the citizens is to be treated as though she were a founding member of the state, a participant in the social contract by which it was established.
Of course these ideas are mythic. The citizen really is not much more than a subject. The state is an independently empowered entity that confronts the subject in her abject vulnerability. The subject, far from being a signatory to any social contract, is in fact more or less helpless in shaping its structures and laws. And it may seem that the most we can do is to try to mitigate this helplessness by arranging a modicum of protection for the subject and ceding a microscopic quantum of political power to the subject and calling that "citizenship." And yet, our commitment to the dignity of citizenship connotes a determination not to always see things in the light. Just as in times past we sacralized and dignified kingship even though we all knew kings were really nothing buthuman animals like any others, so now we create an aura of dignity for the ordinary subject. She is to be saluted, respected, empowered, and answered to, as though this were her society (among others').
To dignify the status of a ruler, we used to tell stories about the God-given rights of kings; and similarly to dignify the status of citizen we tell ourselves stories about social contract. Of course, in both cases we know we are dealing with a fiction, but the fiction may be the best way of tracing the contours of respect that we think are required. 47 The strategy here is a version of the Kantian hypothetical contractarianism that we traced in section I: though the original contract is just an idea of reason, its practical reality is to require law-makers to enact only laws that could have been agreed to in an original contract. 48 But there is this difference:
Kant uses this device primarily as (negative) test or criterion for legitimacy. I am using it also to determine the overall attitude that should be taken towards the subject. Respecting her as a citizen means according her the respect that would be due to one of the framers of the country's legal and constitutional arrangements.
Her concerns are to be answered, her questions are not to be brushed aside, her views are to be respected along with those of everyone else. Whatever her actual political power amounts to, she has standing in these matters.
One way in which the dignity of citizenship, so understood, goes beyond what Kant calls "a touchstone of any public law's conformity with right" has to do with issues of transparency and non-deception. The principles on which the polity operates are to be public; nothing about the operation of the polity is to depend on citizens generally or any group of citizens being deceived or being under a misapprehension about how it works. Again, the social contract idea gives us a useful image for expressing this: the publicness of legal and constitutional arrangements must be such that everyone has access to the knowledge about their operation that she would have if she had been one of the people who set the arrangements and to whose care its continuing operation was committed. 
